Hmbown/CodeWhale · critical

OIDC discovery returned

Error message

OIDC discovery returned {field} on a different origin than the issuer

What it means

A discovered OAuth endpoint is on a different origin (scheme + host + port) than the issuer that advertised it. OAuth security guidance requires endpoints to be same-origin with the issuer to prevent an attacker-controlled document from steering tokens to another host, so cross-origin endpoints are rejected.

Solutions

  1. Configure the IdP so all advertised endpoints share the issuer's public origin.
  2. Check port and scheme match exactly, including default-port handling.
  3. Fix reverse-proxy headers (Host, X-Forwarded-Proto) so generated endpoint URLs use the public origin.
  4. If the provider legitimately uses separate origins, use documented-path endpoint configuration instead of discovery.

Example fix

// before
issuer=https://auth.example.com, token_endpoint=https://internal.svc:8080/token // cross-origin
// after
token_endpoint=https://auth.example.com/token
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

let issuer = reqwest::Url::parse(issuer_url)?;
let endpoint = reqwest::Url::parse(doc["token_endpoint"].as_str()?)?;
if endpoint.origin() != issuer.origin() {
    eprintln!("endpoint origin {} differs from issuer origin {}", endpoint.origin(), issuer.origin());
}

Type guard

fn same_origin(issuer: &Url, endpoint: &Url) -> bool {
    endpoint.origin() == issuer.origin()
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: validate_discovered_oauth_endpoint comparing parsed.origin() of the {field} endpoint against issuer.origin() and finding them different (different host, scheme, or port).

Common situations: IdP behind a proxy advertising internal hostnames (e.g. http://internal-svc:8080) while the issuer is public; port mismatches (default 443 vs explicit :8443); DNS aliases or load-balancer hostnames differing from the issuer host.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of Hmbown/CodeWhale@73e0f67d83 (2026-09-22). Data as JSON: /api/errors/eebd61c1143abcb5. Report an issue: GitHub.

Appendix: source

Thrown at crates/tui/src/oauth.rs:700

    let endpoint = endpoint
        .as_deref()
        .map(str::trim)
        .filter(|endpoint| !endpoint.is_empty())
        .with_context(|| format!("OIDC discovery missing {field}"))?;
    let parsed = reqwest::Url::parse(endpoint)
        .with_context(|| format!("OIDC discovery returned an invalid {field}"))?;
    if !matches!(parsed.scheme(), "http" | "https") {
        bail!("OIDC discovery returned unsupported {field} scheme");
    }
    let issuer = oauth_endpoint_url(issuer).context("OIDC issuer is not a trusted URL")?;
    if issuer.scheme() == "https" && parsed.scheme() != "https" {
        bail!("OIDC discovery attempted to downgrade {field} from HTTPS");
    }
    if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() {
        bail!("OIDC discovery returned credentials in {field}");
    }
    if parsed.origin() != issuer.origin() {
        bail!("OIDC discovery returned {field} on a different origin than the issuer");
    }
    let _ = oauth_endpoint_url(parsed.as_str())?;
    Ok(endpoint.to_string())
}

/// Documented-path endpoints for a provider row, no discovery.
fn fallback_oauth_endpoints(params: &OAuthProviderParams, issuer: &str) -> OAuthEndpoints {
    OAuthEndpoints {
        device_authorization_endpoint: params
            .device_code_path
            .map(|path| format!("{}/{}", issuer.trim_end_matches('/'), path)),
        token_endpoint: format!("{}/{}", issuer.trim_end_matches('/'), params.token_path),
    }
}

/// POST a device-authorization request. Pure transport over an explicit
/// endpoint: discovery (or its absence) is the caller's decision.
fn request_device_grant(

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