JuliusBrussee/caveman · warning · Error

cave_harness_artifact_digest_invalid

cave_harness_artifact_digest_invalid

Error message

cave_harness_artifact_digest_invalid

What it means

SanitizeAttributes enforces a cumulative budget of MaxAttributesBytes (64 KiB) across all key+value bytes combined. Even when each individual key and value passes its own per-item limit, many attributes together can exceed the aggregate cap; the running total is accumulated in sorted order and the function fails closed past 64 KiB.

Source

Thrown at packages/agent/src/adapters.ts:97

  harness: HarnessID;
  wireContract: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
}

export function createHarnessAdapter(
  id: HarnessID,
  identity: HarnessAdapterIdentity,
  wireContract: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,
  invoke: HarnessInvoke,
): HarnessAdapter {
  if (!/^[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z._-]{0,63}$/.test(identity.adapterVersion)) {
    throw new Error("cave_harness_adapter_version_invalid");
  }
  if (!/^[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z._+-]{0,127}$/.test(identity.upstreamVersion)) {
    throw new Error("cave_harness_upstream_version_invalid");
  }
  if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(identity.bundleSHA256) ||
      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(identity.dependencyLockSHA256)) {
    throw new Error("cave_harness_artifact_digest_invalid");
  }
  const manifest = deepFreeze({
    schemaVersion: 1 as const,
    harness: id,
    adapterVersion: identity.adapterVersion,
    upstreamVersion: identity.upstreamVersion,
    bundleSHA256: identity.bundleSHA256,
    dependencyLockSHA256: identity.dependencyLockSHA256,
    wireContract: canonicalRecord(wireContract),
  });
  const contractSHA256 = sha256(stableStringify(manifest));
  return Object.freeze({
    id,
    version: identity.adapterVersion,
    manifest,
    contractSHA256,
    async run(request: HarnessRequest): Promise<HarnessResult> {
      const frozenRequest = snapshotRequest(request);

View on GitHub (pinned to 27d5a3981a)

Solutions

  1. Budget attributes by priority: compute total bytes as you build the map and stop before the cumulative size nears 64 KiB.
  2. Reduce per-value truncation limits (e.g. 1024 bytes) so aggregate size stays well under the cap.
  3. Move bulky, low-signal attributes to logs and keep only identifiers and counters on the span.

Example fix

// before
for _, kv := range collected {
    attrs[kv.key] = kv.value // no aggregate budget
}

// after
var total int
for _, kv := range collected {
    if total+len(kv.key)+len(kv.value) > telemetry.MaxAttributesBytes {
        break // stop before the aggregate cap
    }
    attrs[kv.key] = kv.value
    total += len(kv.key) + len(kv.value)
}
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

func withinAttrBudget(attrs map[string]string) bool {
    total := 0
    for k, v := range attrs {
        if !telemetry.AttributeAllowed(k) {
            continue
        }
        total += len(k) + len(v)
        if total > telemetry.MaxAttributesBytes {
            return false
        }
    }
    return true
}

if !withinAttrBudget(attrs) {
    attrs = pruneToBudget(attrs, telemetry.MaxAttributesBytes)
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: Calling SanitizeAttributes with dozens-to-hundreds of allowlisted attributes whose combined key and value byte lengths exceed 65536 — e.g. 40 attributes each near the 4096-byte value cap, or hundreds of medium-sized labels.

Common situations: Forwarding large label sets (Kubernetes-style metadata) into spans; attaching many truncated-but-still-large values that each individually pass; gradually accruing attributes across middleware layers.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of JuliusBrussee/caveman@27d5a3981a (2026-08-15). Data as JSON: /api/errors/e52c3f1e9cecb001. Report an issue: GitHub.