JuliusBrussee/caveman · warning · Error

cave_harness_upstream_version_invalid

cave_harness_upstream_version_invalid

Error message

cave_harness_upstream_version_invalid

What it means

SanitizeAttributes rejects any single attribute value longer than MaxAttributeValueBytes (4096 bytes). The error names the offending key with %q, so the message pinpoints which attribute to trim. Like the other limits it fails closed so callers can reject or rewrite the record before export.

Source

Thrown at packages/agent/src/adapters.ts:93

}

export interface HarnessAdapterManifest extends HarnessAdapterIdentity {
  schemaVersion: 1;
  harness: HarnessID;
  wireContract: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
}

export function createHarnessAdapter(
  id: HarnessID,
  identity: HarnessAdapterIdentity,
  wireContract: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>,
  invoke: HarnessInvoke,
): HarnessAdapter {
  if (!/^[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z._-]{0,63}$/.test(identity.adapterVersion)) {
    throw new Error("cave_harness_adapter_version_invalid");
  }
  if (!/^[0-9A-Za-z][0-9A-Za-z._+-]{0,127}$/.test(identity.upstreamVersion)) {
    throw new Error("cave_harness_upstream_version_invalid");
  }
  if (!/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(identity.bundleSHA256) ||
      !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/.test(identity.dependencyLockSHA256)) {
    throw new Error("cave_harness_artifact_digest_invalid");
  }
  const manifest = deepFreeze({
    schemaVersion: 1 as const,
    harness: id,
    adapterVersion: identity.adapterVersion,
    upstreamVersion: identity.upstreamVersion,
    bundleSHA256: identity.bundleSHA256,
    dependencyLockSHA256: identity.dependencyLockSHA256,
    wireContract: canonicalRecord(wireContract),
  });
  const contractSHA256 = sha256(stableStringify(manifest));
  return Object.freeze({
    id,
    version: identity.adapterVersion,

View on GitHub (pinned to 27d5a3981a)

Solutions

  1. Truncate large values at the call site and keep a hash or length alongside: value[:min(len(value), 4096)] with a truncated flag.
  2. Move large payloads to a side channel (log, object store) and store only a reference or digest in the attribute.
  3. Exclude known-fat keys (body, payload, stack) from attributes entirely.

Example fix

// before
attrs["sql.query"] = query // query can exceed 4 KiB

// after
const max = telemetry.MaxAttributeValueBytes
q := query
truncated := false
if len(q) > max {
    q = q[:max]
    truncated = true
}
attrs["sql.query"] = q
if truncated {
    attrs["sql.query.truncated"] = "true"
}
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

func clampValue(key, v string) (string, bool) {
    const max = telemetry.MaxAttributeValueBytes
    if len(v) <= max {
        return v, true
    }
    return v[:max], false // truncated; caller may set a truncation flag attribute
}

for k, v := range raw {
    if cv, ok := clampValue(k, v); ok {
        attrs[k] = cv
    } else {
        attrs[k] = cv
        attrs[k+".truncated"] = "true"
    }
}

Type guard

func validAttrValue(v string) bool {
    return len(v) <= telemetry.MaxAttributeValueBytes
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: Calling SanitizeAttributes where an allowlisted key holds a value over 4 KiB — typical offenders: full request/response bodies, stack traces, serialized JSON payloads, base64 blobs stored as attribute values.

Common situations: Recording the whole error body or SQL query as a span attribute; dumping JSON documents or base64-encoded payloads into attributes; capturing full stack traces from deeply recursive panics.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of JuliusBrussee/caveman@27d5a3981a (2026-08-15). Data as JSON: /api/errors/b69a72c9f0fd4984. Report an issue: GitHub.