astrid-runtime/astrid · error

CORS origin carries userinfo (user:password); browsers…

Error message

CORS origin {raw:?} carries userinfo (user:password); browsers strip it before sending `Origin:` so this can never match

What it means

Validation guard in validate_cors_origin: the origin embeds user:password credentials; browsers strip userinfo before sending Origin:, so such an entry can never match a real preflight and is rejected at boot to avoid silent misconfiguration.

Solutions

1. Remove the user:password portion from the origin entry
2. Keep credentials out of CORS origins entirely — use auth headers instead
3. If the URL came from generated config, fix the generator to emit bare scheme://host[:port]

When it happens

Trigger: Thrown at crates/astrid-gateway/src/config.rs:203 when the library encounters an invalid state.

Common situations: See trigger scenarios.

AI-assisted analysis of astrid-runtime/astrid@affd8760f4 (2026-09-09). Data as JSON: /api/errors/0e46fa280aef2339. Report an issue: GitHub.

Appendix: source

Thrown at crates/astrid-gateway/src/config.rs:203

/// match a real preflight; rejecting it here is what makes that
/// surfacable.
fn validate_cors_origin(raw: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let parsed = url::Url::parse(raw)
        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("CORS origin {raw:?} doesn't parse as a URL: {e}"))?;
    match parsed.scheme() {
        "http" | "https" => {},
        other => anyhow::bail!(
            "CORS origin {raw:?} uses scheme {other:?}; only http/https are valid for browser origins"
        ),
    }
    if parsed.host_str().is_none() {
        anyhow::bail!("CORS origin {raw:?} has no host component");
    }
    // Browsers strip userinfo before sending `Origin:`, so a config
    // entry with embedded credentials can never match a real
    // preflight. Reject so operators don't silently misconfigure.
    if !parsed.username().is_empty() || parsed.password().is_some() {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "CORS origin {raw:?} carries userinfo (user:password); browsers strip it before sending `Origin:` so this can never match"
        );
    }
    if parsed.path() != "" && parsed.path() != "/" {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "CORS origin {raw:?} carries a path ({:?}); origins are scheme+host+port only",
            parsed.path()
        );
    }
    if parsed.query().is_some() || parsed.fragment().is_some() {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "CORS origin {raw:?} carries a query/fragment; origins are scheme+host+port only"
        );
    }
    // Disallow trailing-slash forms — browsers send `https://app.example`
    // (no slash) in `Origin:` and the response header is byte-matched.
    if raw.ends_with('/') {
        anyhow::bail!(

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