caddyserver/caddy · error

two policies with same match criteria have conflicting cert

Error message

two policies with same match criteria have conflicting cert selections: %+v vs. %+v

What it means

Two connection policies with identical match criteria both define certificate selection rules (tls { cert_selection ... }) that differ in SerialNumber, SubjectOrganization, PublicKeyAlgorithm, or AllTags. Only AnyTag merging is implemented, so any other mismatch is fatal.

Source

Thrown at caddyconfig/httpcaddyfile/httptype.go:1305

				if cps[i].ProtocolMin != "" &&
					cps[j].ProtocolMin != "" &&
					cps[i].ProtocolMin != cps[j].ProtocolMin {
					return nil, fmt.Errorf("two policies with same match criteria have conflicting min protocol: %s vs. %s",
						cps[i].ProtocolMin, cps[j].ProtocolMin)
				}
				if cps[i].ProtocolMax != "" &&
					cps[j].ProtocolMax != "" &&
					cps[i].ProtocolMax != cps[j].ProtocolMax {
					return nil, fmt.Errorf("two policies with same match criteria have conflicting max protocol: %s vs. %s",
						cps[i].ProtocolMax, cps[j].ProtocolMax)
				}
				if cps[i].CertSelection != nil && cps[j].CertSelection != nil {
					// merging fields other than AnyTag is not implemented
					if !reflect.DeepEqual(cps[i].CertSelection.SerialNumber, cps[j].CertSelection.SerialNumber) ||
						!reflect.DeepEqual(cps[i].CertSelection.SubjectOrganization, cps[j].CertSelection.SubjectOrganization) ||
						cps[i].CertSelection.PublicKeyAlgorithm != cps[j].CertSelection.PublicKeyAlgorithm ||
						!reflect.DeepEqual(cps[i].CertSelection.AllTags, cps[j].CertSelection.AllTags) {
						return nil, fmt.Errorf("two policies with same match criteria have conflicting cert selections: %+v vs. %+v",
							cps[i].CertSelection, cps[j].CertSelection)
					}
				}

				// by now we've decided that we can merge the two -- we'll keep i and drop j

				if len(cps[i].ALPN) == 0 && len(cps[j].ALPN) > 0 {
					cps[i].ALPN = cps[j].ALPN
				}
				if len(cps[i].CipherSuites) == 0 && len(cps[j].CipherSuites) > 0 {
					cps[i].CipherSuites = cps[j].CipherSuites
				}
				if cps[i].ClientAuthentication == nil && cps[j].ClientAuthentication != nil {
					cps[i].ClientAuthentication = cps[j].ClientAuthentication
				}
				if len(cps[i].Curves) == 0 && len(cps[j].Curves) > 0 {
					cps[i].Curves = cps[j].Curves
				}

View on GitHub (pinned to 50e54ee279)

Solutions

  1. Keep a single cert_selection block per hostname set and delete duplicates
  2. If both are needed, make every field except AnyTag identical
  3. Move one selection to a distinct hostname so the SNI matchers differ

Example fix

# before
example.com {
  tls {
    cert_selection {
      public_key_algorithm rsa
    }
  }
}
example.com {
  tls {
    cert_selection {
      public_key_algorithm ecdsa
    }
  }
}
# after
example.com {
  tls {
    cert_selection {
      public_key_algorithm rsa
    }
  }
}
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

for h, sels in group_certselection_by_host(sites).items():
    assert len({canonical(s) for s in sels}) <= 1, f'conflicting cert_selection for {h}'

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: Two site blocks for the same hostname(s) each declaring a `cert_selection` block with different criteria — e.g. one selects by serial number, another by public key algorithm — leaving both policies with the same SNI matchers at consolidation time.

Common situations: Choosing among multiple certs for the same name with duplicated site blocks, or importing a cert-selection snippet twice with tweaked values.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of caddyserver/caddy@50e54ee279 (2026-08-15). Data as JSON: /api/errors/fcf01a1f25524571. Report an issue: GitHub.