Provider delete URL must not embed an account credential

Error message

Provider delete URL must not embed an account credential

What it means

sanitizeDeleteAction scrubss a provider's remote delete action so the persisted handle never embeds the account credential. If the delete URL (origin, path, or hash — and even an unparseable raw string) contains the literal credential substring, this error is thrown instead of storing it. Query parameters that embed the credential are silently stripped; only origin/path/hash fragments are hard-rejected.

Source

Thrown at packages/coding-agent/src/blob-broker/provider-file-types.ts:183

	}
	return normalized;
}

function errorMessage(error: unknown): string {
	return error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
}

function containsCredential(value: string, credential: string): boolean {
	return credential.length > 0 && value.includes(credential);
}

function sanitizeDeleteAction(action: RemoteDeleteAction, credential: string): RemoteDeleteAction {
	let url: URL;
	try {
		url = new URL(action.url);
	} catch {
		if (containsCredential(action.url, credential)) {
			throw new Error("Provider delete URL must not embed an account credential");
		}
		url = new URL(action.url, "https://provider-file.invalid");
	}
	if (containsCredential(url.origin + url.pathname + url.hash, credential)) {
		throw new Error("Provider delete URL must not embed an account credential");
	}
	for (const name of [...url.searchParams.keys()]) {
		const values = url.searchParams.getAll(name);
		if (
			SENSITIVE_QUERY_PARAMETERS[name.toLowerCase()] ||
			values.some(value => containsCredential(value, credential))
		) {
			url.searchParams.delete(name);
		}
	}
	let headers: Record<string, string> | undefined;
	if (action.headers) {
		for (const name in action.headers) {

View on GitHub (pinned to 9690622007)

Solutions

Change the provider adapter to pass credentials via headers or query parameters, never in origin/path/hash.
Use a token-redacting URL builder so the credential never appears in the URL string.
If the credential is a broad substring colliding innocently, ensure the credential value used for hashing/matching is the actual secret, not a derived or shared string.
Rotate the credential if it was ever persisted.

Example fix

// before
{ url: `https://api.p.com/v1/files/${id}/token=${credential}` }
// after
{ url: `https://api.p.com/v1/files/${id}`, headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${credential}` } }

Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

function urlEmbedsCredential(rawUrl: string, credential: string): boolean {
  if (!credential) return false;
  try {
    const u = new URL(rawUrl);
    return (u.origin + u.pathname + u.hash).includes(credential);
  } catch {
    return rawUrl.includes(credential);
  }
}
// call before constructing the delete action; move the credential to headers if true

Try / catch

try {
  const handle = persistProviderFileHandle(rawHandle, credential);
} catch (err) {
  if (err instanceof Error && err.message.includes("must not embed an account credential")) {
    // rebuild delete action with Authorization header instead of URL credential
    return persistProviderFileHandle({ ...rawHandle, delete: withHeaderAuth(rawHandle.delete, credential) }, credential);
  }
  throw err;
}

Prevention

Never put API tokens in the URL origin, path, or fragment — use headers
Pass credentials via query parameters only if unavoidable (they get stripped, not rejected)
Review custom provider adapters for URL interpolation of secrets
Rotate any credential that may have been persisted in a handle

When it happens

Trigger: A provider adapter builds RemoteDeleteAction.url with the API key/token in the URL — e.g. "https://api.example.com/files/f1?key=<token>" where the token also appears in the path, or a relative URL whose raw text contains the credential while also failing URL parsing.

Common situations: A custom/less common provider puts auth in the URL path or fragment; an adapter interpolates the token into the pathname by mistake; the credential accidentally equals a generic substring appearing in the URL (over-broad match).

Related errors

AI-assisted analysis of can1357/oh-my-pi@9690622007 (2026-08-31). Data as JSON: /api/errors/bf6210068a358dfe. Report an issue: GitHub.