gofiber/fiber · warning
cache: failed to delete key %q: %w
Error message
cache: failed to delete key %q: %w
What it means
Thrown at middleware/cache/manager.go:201 by manager.del() when storage.DeleteWithContext fails. The cache middleware deletes keys during invalidation (e.g. when a cached response is stale beyond revalidation, or on explicit purge); a failure here means the storage backend rejected the DELETE.
Source
Thrown at middleware/cache/manager.go:201
// set data to storage or memory
func (m *manager) setRaw(ctx context.Context, key string, raw []byte, exp time.Duration) error {
if m.storage != nil {
if err := m.storage.SetWithContext(ctx, key, raw, exp); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cache: failed to store raw key %q: %w", m.logKey(key), err)
}
return nil
}
m.memory.Set(key, raw, exp)
return nil
}
// delete data from storage or memory
func (m *manager) del(ctx context.Context, key string) error {
if m.storage != nil {
if err := m.storage.DeleteWithContext(ctx, key); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cache: failed to delete key %q: %w", m.logKey(key), err)
}
return nil
}
m.memory.Delete(key)
return nil
}
func (m *manager) logKey(key string) string {
if m.shouldRedactKeys {
return redactedKey
}
return key
}
View on GitHub (pinned to 9a4c7e57fe)
Solutions
- Check the wrapped error for the backend-specific cause and fix it (connectivity, ACLs, timeout).
- Grant the storage user DELETE permission if it was scoped to read/write only.
- Tune the storage driver timeout so deletes complete within the request lifetime.
- Make cache invalidation best-effort: log the failure and let entries expire via TTL instead of failing the user request.
- Verify storage connectivity with a health probe on a regular schedule.
Example fix
// before: invalidate failure bubbles up as 500
// (default error handler)
// after: log + degrade; TTL still bounds staleness
origHandler := app.ErrorHandler
app.ErrorHandler = func(c fiber.Ctx, err error) error {
if strings.HasPrefix(err.Error(), "cache: failed to delete") {
log.Printf("cache delete failed (TTL will reclaim): %v", err)
return c.Next()
}
return origHandler(c, err)
} Defensive patterns
Strategy: fallback
Validate before calling
// Confirm DELETE works at boot (some ACLs grant SET but not DELETE).
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second)
defer cancel()
_ = store.SetWithContext(ctx, "__del_probe__", []byte("x"), time.Minute)
if err := store.DeleteWithContext(ctx, "__del_probe__"); err != nil {
log.Fatalf("cache storage DELETE denied: %v", err)
} Try / catch
if err := m.storage.DeleteWithContext(ctx, key); err != nil {
// Best-effort: TTL will reclaim the entry anyway.
log.Printf("cache delete failed for %q (TTL reclaims): %v", key, err)
return nil
} Prevention
- Grant the storage user DELETE permission alongside GET/SET.
- Make invalidation best-effort; rely on TTL as the safety net.
- Avoid pointing the cache at read-only storage replicas.
- Monitor delete-error rates; they often reveal failover or ACL drift.
When it happens
Trigger: Cache invalidation path runs while Storage is unreachable, the connection timed out, or the request context was cancelled before the DELETE completed.
Common situations: Storage backend briefly down during an invalidate call; ctx cancellation; Redis in a read-only replica mode; ACL/permission mismatch where the app user lacks DELETE permission.
Related errors
- cache: failed to get key %q from storage: %w
- cache: failed to get raw key %q from storage: %w
- cache: failed to store key %q: %w
- cache: failed to store raw key %q: %w
- csrf: failed to fetch token from storage: %w
AI-assisted analysis of gofiber/fiber@9a4c7e57fe (2026-08-04).
Data as JSON: /data/errors/23f067e76f113559.json.
Report an issue: GitHub.