golang/go · error

crypto/rsa: prime factor is <= 1

Error message

crypto/rsa: prime factor is <= 1

What it means

Thrown in the legacy precompute loop when a prime compares <= 1 (i.e., 0, 1, or negative). A valid RSA prime must be an integer >= 2; values <= 1 would make Sub(prime, bigOne) zero or negative, breaking Mod and ModInverse. This guard rejects degenerate/corrupted primes.

Source

Thrown at src/crypto/rsa/rsa.go:648

	var precomputed PrecomputedValues

	k, err := rsa.NewPrivateKeyWithoutCRT(priv.N.Bytes(), priv.E, priv.D.Bytes())
	if err != nil {
		return precomputed, err
	}
	precomputed.fips = k

	if len(priv.Primes) < 2 {
		return precomputed, nil
	}

	// Ensure the Mod and ModInverse calls below don't panic.
	for _, prime := range priv.Primes {
		if prime == nil {
			return precomputed, errors.New("crypto/rsa: prime factor is nil")
		}
		if prime.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 {
			return precomputed, errors.New("crypto/rsa: prime factor is <= 1")
		}
	}

	precomputed.Dp = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[0], bigOne)
	precomputed.Dp.Mod(priv.D, precomputed.Dp)

	precomputed.Dq = new(big.Int).Sub(priv.Primes[1], bigOne)
	precomputed.Dq.Mod(priv.D, precomputed.Dq)

	precomputed.Qinv = new(big.Int).ModInverse(priv.Primes[1], priv.Primes[0])
	if precomputed.Qinv == nil {
		return precomputed, errors.New("crypto/rsa: prime factors are not relatively prime")
	}

	r := new(big.Int).Mul(priv.Primes[0], priv.Primes[1])
	precomputed.CRTValues = make([]CRTValue, len(priv.Primes)-2)
	for i := 2; i < len(priv.Primes); i++ {
		prime := priv.Primes[i]

View on GitHub (pinned to b6b368adc5)

Solutions

  1. Discard the key and generate a valid one with rsa.GenerateKey.
  2. Run priv.Validate() on loaded keys; it performs deeper consistency checks than the prime guards.
  3. If importing untrusted key material, validate primes are > 1 and reasonably sized before use.
  4. Check the source of the key encoding for truncation or default-value substitution.

Example fix

// before
priv.Primes = []*big.Int{big.NewInt(1), big.NewInt(1)}
err := priv.Validate() // -> prime factor is <= 1

// after
priv, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
if err != nil { return err }
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

func checkPrimesPositive(priv *rsa.PrivateKey) error {
    one := big.NewInt(1)
    for i, p := range priv.Primes {
        if p == nil || p.Cmp(one) <= 0 {
            return fmt.Errorf("rsa: prime[%d] invalid (<=1)", i)
        }
    }
    return priv.Validate()
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: Sign/Decrypt/Validate on a key whose priv.Primes contains a value that is 0, 1, or negative. Usually a corrupted key, a test stub, or a deserialization that defaulted unset fields to big.NewInt(0).

Common situations: Test fixtures with Primes set to big.NewInt(1); JSON unmarshaling that left a prime as zero; tampered or adversarially crafted key material; accidental reuse of bigOne as a prime.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of golang/go@b6b368adc5 (2026-08-12). Data as JSON: /api/errors/87fe8728048e5855. Report an issue: GitHub.