hyperledger/fabric · critical
error getting random bytes
Error message
error getting random bytes
What it means
GetRandomBytes reads len bytes from crypto/rand and wraps any read failure with 'error getting random bytes'. This means the OS CSPRNG failed, which is nearly fatal for security-sensitive operations like nonce generation.
Source
Thrown at common/crypto/random.go:36
import (
"crypto/rand"
"github.com/pkg/errors"
)
const (
// NonceSize is the default NonceSize
NonceSize = 24
)
// GetRandomBytes returns len random looking bytes
func GetRandomBytes(len int) ([]byte, error) {
key := make([]byte, len)
_, err := rand.Read(key)
if err != nil {
return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "error getting random bytes")
}
return key, nil
}
// GetRandomNonce returns a random byte array of length NonceSize
func GetRandomNonce() ([]byte, error) {
return GetRandomBytes(NonceSize)
}
View on GitHub (pinned to 2736b63f8f)
Solutions
- Fix the OS entropy/random device access (check /dev/urandom exists and is readable in the container)
- Check ulimit/file-descriptor exhaustion (lsof, ulimit -n) and fix leaks
- Upgrade kernel/host so getrandom(2) never blocks; modern kernels do not have entropy starvation
- Retry the operation once the host random source is healthy — do not substitute math/rand
Defensive patterns
Strategy: retry
Validate before calling
// sanity check host randomness before relying on it
if f, err := os.Open("/dev/urandom"); err != nil { log.Fatal("no entropy source") } else { f.Close() } Try / catch
nonce, err := crypto.GetRandomNonce()
if err != nil {
if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "error getting random bytes") {
// log root cause, alert, and back off; do NOT fall back to math/rand
return nil
}
} Prevention
- Never substitute math/rand or static values for CSPRNG failures
- Monitor container fd limits and /dev/urandom availability
- Run modern kernels where getrandom(2) never blocks
When it happens
Trigger: Calling GetRandomBytes (or GetRandomNonce, which calls it) when rand.Read fails — e.g. exhausted entropy or a broken /dev/urandom on Linux, or file-descriptor exhaustion.
Common situations: Containers with restricted /dev/urandom access; systems under entropy starvation on old kernels; fd leaks causing open failures of the random source; misconfigured sandbox/seccomp profiles blocking getrandom(2).
Related errors
- error getting random bytes
- found unknown private key type (%T) in msg signing
- found unknown private key type (%T) in PKCS#8 wrapping
- failed to parse private key: %v
- Unknown hashing algorithm type: %s
AI-assisted analysis of hyperledger/fabric@2736b63f8f (2026-09-04).
Data as JSON: /api/errors/e076a67817ba71d1.
Report an issue: GitHub.