koala73/worldmonitor · error · ConvexError

NOT_OWNER

NOT_OWNER

Error message

NOT_OWNER

What it means

`removeSeat` is owner-only: the authenticated user must equal `grant.ownerUserId`. Any other signed-in user (including the invitee themselves) is rejected with NOT_OWNER. This is an authorization guard, not a not-found condition — the grant exists but the caller is not its owner.

Source

Thrown at convex/payments/businessSeats.ts:424

      })),
    };
  },
});

/**
 * Owner-only removal of a single seat. Revokes the grant and recomputes the
 * invitee's entitlement.
 */
export const removeSeat = mutation({
  args: { grantId: v.id("businessProGrants") },
  handler: async (ctx, args) => {
    const userId = await requireUserId(ctx);
    const grant = await ctx.db.get(args.grantId);
    if (!grant) {
      throw new ConvexError({ kind: "GRANT_NOT_FOUND" });
    }
    if (grant.ownerUserId !== userId) {
      throw new ConvexError({ kind: "NOT_OWNER" });
    }
    if (grant.status !== "pending" && grant.status !== "accepted") {
      return { ok: true as const, status: "already_inactive" as const };
    }

    const now = Date.now();
    // Serialize with inviteSeats via the per-Business-subscription lock row.
    await touchBusinessSeatLock(ctx, grant.businessSubscriptionId, now);

    await ctx.db.patch(args.grantId, { status: "revoked" });

    if (grant.inviteeUserId) {
      await ctx.runMutation(
        internal.payments.subscriptionHelpers.recomputeEntitlementForUser,
        { userId: grant.inviteeUserId, eventTimestamp: now },
      );
    }
    return { ok: true as const, status: "revoked" as const };

View on GitHub (pinned to ffec79ac33)

Solutions

1. Only invoke `removeSeat` from the Business subscription owner's authenticated session
2. Gate the remove-seat UI on ownership before showing the control
3. Use a dedicated invitee self-service/leave flow if one exists, rather than the owner mutation

// Only enable the remove-seat control when the current user is the grant's owner.
const isOwner = grant.ownerUserId === currentUserId;
if (!isOwner) { /* hide/disable remove control */ }

function canRemoveSeat(grant: { ownerUserId: string } | null, currentUserId: string | null): boolean {
  return Boolean(grant && currentUserId && grant.ownerUserId === currentUserId);
}

When it happens

Trigger: An invitee or an unrelated account calls `removeSeat` on a grant they do not own. The grant resolves successfully, but `grant.ownerUserId !== userId`.

Common situations: An invitee attempts to self-revoke via the owner's endpoint; cross-account confusion where two business owners share an admin surface; frontend bug surfacing the remove control to non-owners.

Related errors

• SEAT_CAP_REACHED
• GRANT_NOT_FOUND
• PRO_REQUIRED
• API_ACCESS_REQUIRED
• COMPANY_MONITORING_ACCESS_DENIED

AI-assisted analysis of koala73/worldmonitor@ffec79ac33 (2026-08-12). Data as JSON: /api/errors/5832250e28c71891. Report an issue: GitHub.