nanocoai/nanoclaw · error · StdinJsonInputError

--stdin-json input must be one JSON object

Error message

--stdin-json input must be one JSON object

What it means

Second guard in parseMemoryMb: the value matched the size grammar but the numeric part is not finite (Number(match[1]) is NaN/Infinity). Practically hard to reach via the regex, but it keeps the parse total function and still fails closed rather than dropping the operator's memory cap.

Source

Thrown at container/agent-runner/src/cli/stdin-json.ts:76

  return Buffer.concat(chunks, byteLength).toString('utf8');
}

/** Parse the input, requiring exactly one JSON object — not an array, scalar, or null. */
function parseJsonObject(source: string): Record<string, unknown> {
  if (source.trim().length === 0) {
    throw new StdinJsonInputError('--stdin-json input is empty');
  }

  let parsed: unknown;
  try {
    parsed = JSON.parse(source);
  } catch (err) {
    throw new StdinJsonInputError('--stdin-json input is not valid JSON', { cause: err });
  }

  if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object' || Array.isArray(parsed)) {
    throw new StdinJsonInputError('--stdin-json input must be one JSON object');
  }

  return parsed as Record<string, unknown>;
}

/** Match the key normalization applied by command parsers in crud.ts. */
function canonicalArgKey(key: string): string {
  return key.replace(/-/g, '_');
}

/**
 * Reject any stdin key that could collide with another arg after the merge.
 *
 * Command parsers (crud.ts) normalize `-` to `_` in arg keys, so `group-id`
 * and `group_id` are the same argument downstream. Two keys that are distinct
 * here but identical after normalization would silently overwrite each other
 * past this point — so every such alias is a hard conflict, whether the pair
 * is stdin-vs-argv or two stdin keys.

View on GitHub (pinned to 294ef2aee8)

Solutions

  1. Use a realistic finite value like 8g or 4096m
  2. If you need 'no cap', set CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT=0
  3. Audit .env generation scripts that compute the limit

Example fix

# before
CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT=999999999999999999999999999999g

# after
CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT=8g
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

const raw = process.env.CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT;
if (raw) {
  const m = /^(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*([bkmg]?)b?$/i.exec(raw.trim());
  if (!m || !Number.isFinite(Number(m[1]))) throw new Error('bad CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT');
}

Type guard

function isFiniteDockerSize(v: string): boolean {
  const m = /^(\d+(?:\.\d+)?)\s*([bkmg]?)b?$/i.exec(v.trim());
  return !!m && Number.isFinite(Number(m[1]));
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: composeSessionSpec() parses a CONTAINER_MEMORY_LIMIT whose numeric component converts to a non-finite Number — e.g. an astronomically long digit string that overflows to Infinity.

Common situations: Script-generated env values, a pasted number with hundreds of digits, or edge-case fuzzing of the env var.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of nanocoai/nanoclaw@294ef2aee8 (2026-08-28). Data as JSON: /api/errors/f3c3b4a38657f4a3. Report an issue: GitHub.