nautechsystems/nautilus_trader · critical

Signed transaction payload authentication failed

Error message

Signed transaction payload authentication failed

What it means

Thrown in `unseal` when AEAD `open_in_place` fails authentication: the ciphertext, nonce, or additional authenticated data (AAD) does not match what was sealed under the given key. The library treats this as a hard integrity failure and returns no plaintext.

Source

Thrown at crates/adapters/blockchain/src/execution/sealing.rs:206

        &self,
        envelope: &[u8],
        context: &PayloadContext,
    ) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<u8>> {
        validate_context(context, &self.deployment_id)?;
        let parsed = parse_envelope(envelope)?;
        let key = self.keys.get(&parsed.key_id).ok_or_else(|| {
            anyhow::anyhow!(
                "Payload sealing key {} is not configured",
                hex::encode(parsed.key_id)
            )
        })?;
        let aad = encode_aad(&parsed.key_id, context)?;
        let nonce = Nonce::try_assume_unique_for_key(parsed.nonce)
            .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Signed transaction payload nonce is invalid"))?;
        let mut plaintext = parsed.ciphertext_and_tag.to_vec();
        let plaintext_len = key
            .open_in_place(nonce, Aad::from(aad), &mut plaintext)
            .map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("Signed transaction payload authentication failed"))?
            .len();
        plaintext.truncate(plaintext_len);
        anyhow::ensure!(
            plaintext.len() <= MAX_SIGNED_TRANSACTION_BYTES,
            "Unsealed transaction payload is {} bytes, exceeding the {} byte limit",
            plaintext.len(),
            MAX_SIGNED_TRANSACTION_BYTES
        );
        Ok(plaintext)
    }
}

pub(crate) fn authenticate_payload(
    raw_transaction: &[u8],
    intent: &ExecutionIntentRow,
    hash: &ExecutionTransactionHashRow,
    policy: PayloadPolicy,
    deployment_id: &str,

View on GitHub (pinned to 18893faf8b)

Solutions

  1. Verify the `PayloadContext` passed to `unseal` exactly matches the intent/transaction row the payload was sealed with (use `payload_context` to build it)
  2. Confirm the deployment_id and key set match those used at seal time
  3. If the envelope is corrupted, restore from backup or re-seal from the source transaction

Example fix

// before
let plaintext = sealer.unseal(&envelope, &other_intent_context)?;
// after
let ctx = payload_context(&intent_row, &hash_row, DEPLOYMENT_ID)?;
let plaintext = sealer.unseal(&envelope, &ctx)?;
Defensive patterns

Strategy: try-catch

Validate before calling

let ctx = payload_context(&intent_row, &hash_row, DEPLOYMENT_ID)?; // build context from the same rows used at seal time

Try / catch

let plaintext = sealer.unseal(&envelope, &ctx).map_err(|e| {
    e.context(format!(
        "unseal failed for intent {}; verify deployment_id and payload context match seal-time values",
        intent_row.id
    ))
})?;

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: Calling `unseal` with a payload sealed under a different `PayloadContext` (different intent ID, nonce, chain ID, transaction hash, or deployment_id), or with tampered/corrupted ciphertext.

Common situations: Mismatched deployment_id after environment clones, replaying an envelope against a different intent's context, storage bit-rot, or using a wrong-but-present key ID collision after rotation.

Understand the failure class

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of nautechsystems/nautilus_trader@18893faf8b (2026-09-08). Data as JSON: /api/errors/b17ebd80e74db76b. Report an issue: GitHub.