nautechsystems/nautilus_trader · error
validated proxy storage value
Error message
validated proxy storage value
What it means
In the same proxy-verification path, the expected storage value is parsed with `B256::from_str(&proxy.storage_value).expect("validated proxy storage value")`. Like the slot, the manifest is pre-validated by `validate_config` (verification.rs:1291), which guarantees `storage_value` is valid 32-byte hex, making this expect an internal invariant. Reaching it means an unvalidated or hand-built manifest reached `verify_deployment_manifest`.
Source
Thrown at crates/adapters/blockchain/src/rpc/verification.rs:657
}
VerificationOutcome::Retryable(failure) => {
return VerificationOutcome::Retryable(failure);
}
VerificationOutcome::LocallyInvalid(failure) => {
return VerificationOutcome::LocallyInvalid(failure);
}
};
if code.is_empty() || keccak256(&code) != expected_hash {
return VerificationOutcome::Disagreement(
self.failure(VerificationRead::DeploymentIdentity),
);
}
if let Some(proxy) = &contract.proxy {
let slot = B256::from_str(&proxy.storage_slot).expect("validated proxy slot");
let expected =
B256::from_str(&proxy.storage_value).expect("validated proxy storage value");
match self.verify_storage(&address, &slot, block).await {
VerificationOutcome::Verified(verified) if verified.value == expected => {}
VerificationOutcome::Verified(_) => {
return VerificationOutcome::Disagreement(
self.failure(VerificationRead::DeploymentIdentity),
);
}
VerificationOutcome::Disagreement(failure) => {
return VerificationOutcome::Disagreement(failure);
}
VerificationOutcome::Unavailable(failure) => {
return VerificationOutcome::Unavailable(failure);
}
VerificationOutcome::Retryable(failure) => {
return VerificationOutcome::Retryable(failure);
}
VerificationOutcome::LocallyInvalid(failure) => {
return VerificationOutcome::LocallyInvalid(failure);View on GitHub (pinned to 18893faf8b)
Solutions
- Validate the manifest with `validate_config` before calling `verify_deployment_manifest`.
- Correct `proxy.storage_value` in the manifest to exactly 64 hex digits (with 0x).
- In your own code, parse with `B256::from_str` and map the error instead of expecting.
- Re-generate the manifest through its official source/generator rather than editing by hand.
Example fix
// before
let expected = B256::from_str(&proxy.storage_value).expect("validated proxy storage value");
// after
let expected = B256::from_str(&proxy.storage_value)
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid proxy storage_value {:?}: {e}", proxy.storage_value))?; Defensive patterns
Strategy: validation
Validate before calling
fn validate_proxy_storage_value(proxy: &ProxyInfo) -> Result<B256, String> {
let s = proxy.storage_value.trim();
let hex = s.strip_prefix("0x").unwrap_or(s);
if hex.len() != 64 || !hex.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
return Err(format!("storage_value must be 32-byte hex, got {s:?}"));
}
B256::from_str(s).map_err(|e| e.to_string())
} Try / catch
// Validate at load time, not at verification time
validate_config(&manifest).map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid manifest: {e}"))?; Prevention
- Generate manifests via the official generator; never hand-edit hex fields.
- Enforce 64-hex-digit storage values with a schema/validator on the manifest file.
- Diff regenerated manifests in CI to catch corrupted values early.
When it happens
Trigger: Verifying a manifest whose `proxy.storage_value` is not valid 32-byte hex (truncated value, missing 0x, non-hex chars) without first passing `validate_config` — typically manifests loaded directly from JSON or constructed in tests.
Common situations: Hand-edited manifest files with a truncated storage value; copying a value of the wrong length (e.g. 32 hex chars instead of 64); test manifests built bypassing validation; older schema manifests with differently formatted values.
Understand the failure class
Background: "This is a bug, please report it": internal invariant violations, unreachable panics, and SNH errors explained — this error's family across 47 libraries.
Related errors
- validated proxy slot
- validated proxy target
- in-flight mutex poisoned
- wallet balance mutex poisoned
- instrument update lock poisoned
AI-assisted analysis of nautechsystems/nautilus_trader@18893faf8b (2026-09-08).
Data as JSON: /api/errors/078b09235c1ec937.
Report an issue: GitHub.