nautechsystems/nautilus_trader · critical · anyhow::Error

Verified transaction fields differ from the authenticated si

Error message

Verified transaction fields differ from the authenticated signed payload

What it means

Before submitting a raw transaction, the library decodes the locally signed payload and compares every field of the RPC-returned transaction (hash, from, nonce, chain_id, type=2 EIP-1559, to, etc.) against the decoded signature. This error means the transaction the node reports differs from what was actually signed — a safety check against RPC tampering, field mutation, or decoding mismatches.

Source

Thrown at crates/adapters/blockchain/src/execution/client.rs:4287

) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    anyhow::ensure!(
        profiler_block <= latest_block,
        "Pool state at block {profiler_block} is ahead of the latest block {latest_block}; the execution RPC endpoint lags the data feed"
    );
    let quote_age = latest_block - profiler_block;
    anyhow::ensure!(
        quote_age <= max_age_blocks,
        "Stale quote: pool state at block {profiler_block}, latest block {latest_block}, exceeds `max_quote_age_blocks` {max_age_blocks}"
    );
    Ok(())
}

fn validate_rpc_transaction_matches_payload(
    transaction: &RpcTransaction,
    raw_transaction: &[u8],
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
    let signed = decode_signed_transaction(raw_transaction)?;
    anyhow::ensure!(
        transaction.hash == signed.hash
            && transaction.from == signed.signer
            && transaction.nonce == signed.nonce
            && transaction.chain_id == Some(signed.chain_id)
            && transaction.transaction_type == Some(2)
            && transaction.to == Some(signed.to)
            && transaction.input == signed.input
            && transaction.value == signed.value
            && transaction.gas == Some(signed.gas_limit)
            && transaction.max_fee_per_gas == Some(U256::from(signed.max_fee_per_gas))
            && transaction.max_priority_fee_per_gas
                == Some(U256::from(signed.max_priority_fee_per_gas)),
        "Verified transaction fields differ from the authenticated signed payload"
    );
    Ok(())
}

async fn verify_finalized_transaction(

View on GitHub (pinned to 18893faf8b)

Solutions

Re-sign and re-send with a consistent signer/encoder version; verify chain_id and type=2 (EIP-1559) are set at signing time.
Inspect any RPC proxy/middleware between client and node for field mutation; bypass or fix it.
Confirm the raw bytes passed to validation are exactly the signed payload (not re-encoded).
Upgrade the signing and transaction decode libraries to matched versions so field encoding agrees.

Example fix

// before: raw bytes re-encoded before validation
let raw = re_encode_for_rpc(&signed_tx);
validate_rpc_transaction_matches_payload(&fetched, &raw)?;

// after: validate against the exact signed payload
let raw = signed_tx.encoded_2718();
validate_rpc_transaction_matches_payload(&fetched, raw)?;

Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

let signed = decode_signed_transaction(&raw)?;
assert_eq!(fetched.hash, signed.hash);
assert_eq!(fetched.from, signed.signer);
assert_eq!(fetched.nonce, signed.nonce);
assert_eq!(fetched.chain_id, Some(signed.chain_id));
assert_eq!(fetched.transaction_type, Some(2));

Type guard

fn tx_matches_payload(tx: &RpcTransaction, signed: &SignedTx) -> bool {
    tx.hash == signed.hash
        && tx.from == signed.signer
        && tx.nonce == signed.nonce
        && tx.chain_id == Some(signed.chain_id)
        && tx.transaction_type == Some(2)
        && tx.to == Some(signed.to)
}

Try / catch

match client.send_raw_transaction(&raw).await {
    Ok(h) => h,
    Err(e) if e.to_string().contains("differ from the authenticated signed payload") => {
        // treat as potentially tampered: re-sign locally and abort this submission
        resign_and_abort(e)
    }
    Err(e) => return Err(e),
}

Prevention

Validate against the exact encoded_2718 signed bytes, never re-encoded payloads
Audit RPC proxies/middleware for transaction field mutation
Keep signer and transaction libraries on matched versions
Always sign with explicit chain_id and EIP-1559 type

When it happens

Trigger: Calling validate_rpc_transaction_matches_payload when the fetched RpcTransaction differs from decode_signed_transaction(raw_transaction) on hash, signer, nonce, chain_id, transaction_type != 2, or to address.

Common situations: RPC proxy/middleware rewriting transaction fields (e.g., adding gas or changing type); signing and sending through different library versions (legacy vs EIP-1559 encoding mismatch); decoding the wrong raw bytes; malicious or buggy relayer modifying the payload.

Understand the failure class

Background: Checksum mismatch errors: "checksum verification failed", "digest mismatch", "expected vs actual checksum" — what they mean and how to fix them — this error's family across 41 libraries.

Authentication and authorization failures — expired tokens, bad credentials, and missing scopes.

Related errors

AI-assisted analysis of nautechsystems/nautilus_trader@18893faf8b (2026-09-08). Data as JSON: /api/errors/cc37c844e3fc1dc2. Report an issue: GitHub.