projectdiscovery/nuclei · error

ntlm: message too short

Error message

ntlm: message too short

What it means

parseNTLMMessage rejects any decoded blob shorter than 12 bytes, the minimum NTLMSSP fixed header: the 8-byte 'NTLMSSP\x00' signature plus the 4-byte little-endian message type. The input base64-decoded successfully but the result is too small to be any valid NTLM message, so offsets like data[8:12] would be out of bounds.

Source

Thrown at pkg/js/libs/http/ntlm.go:90

	case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "ntlm "):
		s = strings.TrimSpace(s[5:])
	case strings.HasPrefix(lower, "negotiate "):
		s = strings.TrimSpace(s[10:])
	}
	// Some servers return "Negotiate <spnego>" - still try base64 of remainder.
	raw, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
	if err != nil {
		raw, err = base64.RawStdEncoding.DecodeString(s)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, fmt.Errorf("ntlm: base64 decode: %w", err)
		}
	}
	return raw, nil
}

func parseNTLMMessage(data []byte) (*NTLMInfo, error) {
	if len(data) < 12 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ntlm: message too short")
	}
	if !bytes.HasPrefix(data, []byte("NTLMSSP\x00")) {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ntlm: missing NTLMSSP signature")
	}
	msgType := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(data[8:12])
	info := &NTLMInfo{MessageType: int(msgType)}
	if msgType != 2 {
		// Type 1/3: return type only; TargetInfo is Type-2 specific.
		return info, nil
	}
	if len(data) < 48 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("ntlm: challenge too short")
	}

	targetNameLen := binary.LittleEndian.Uint16(data[12:14])
	targetNameOffset := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(data[16:20])
	if targetNameLen > 0 && int(targetNameOffset)+int(targetNameLen) <= len(data) {
		info.TargetName = decodeUTF16LE(data[targetNameOffset : targetNameOffset+uint32(targetNameLen)])

View on GitHub (pinned to 265b3a3dec)

Solutions

  1. Re-fetch the challenge and pass the complete token from the 401 response that follows a Type-1 negotiate (http.NegotiateNTLM())
  2. Check the base64 token length: 16 base64 characters are needed to represent the 12-byte minimum, so shorter tokens can never be valid
  3. If the endpoint is not NTLM-capable, skip the decode step entirely
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

function isPlausibleNTLMLength(token) {
  // 12-byte minimum NTLMSSP header needs at least 16 base64 characters
  return /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/.test(token) && token.length >= 16;
}

Try / catch

try {
  const info = http.DecodeNTLM(token);
} catch (e) {
  // Blob too short to be NTLM; ignore endpoint
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: DecodeNTLM('NTLM QQ==') (decodes to a single byte); a challenge token truncated mid-base64 that still decodes to a few bytes; passing base64 of short unrelated strings; proxy or middleware trimming the header value.

Common situations: Copy-pasting partial tokens from documentation or Burp; test fixtures with placeholder tokens like 'AAAA'; responses passed through gateways that shorten header values; probing hosts that are not AD members.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of projectdiscovery/nuclei@265b3a3dec (2026-08-15). Data as JSON: /api/errors/060422a6cfe09ca7. Report an issue: GitHub.