zeroclaw-labs/zeroclaw · error

path '{path}' is a broad system root; set allow_broad_roots

Error message

path '{path}' is a broad system root; set allow_broad_roots = true to watch it

What it means

`FilesystemConfig` denies watching broad system roots (`/`, `/home`, `/etc`, `/var`, `/proc`, `/sys`, `/dev`, `/tmp`) unless `allow_broad_roots = true`. Trailing slashes are normalized before the check, so `/home/` still matches. The guard exists because pseudo-filesystems like `/proc` and `/sys` flood the watcher with kernel-object events and can leak system paths into SOP payloads.

Source

Thrown at crates/zeroclaw-config/src/schema.rs:16428

        }
    }
}

const FILESYSTEM_BROAD_ROOTS: [&str; 8] = [
    "/", "/home", "/etc", "/var", "/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/tmp",
];

impl FilesystemConfig {
    /// Validate the filesystem listener configuration.
    pub fn validate(&self) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
        if self.paths.is_empty() {
            anyhow::bail!("at least one path must be configured");
        }
        for path in &self.paths {
            let trimmed = path.trim_end_matches('/');
            let normalized = if trimmed.is_empty() { "/" } else { trimmed };
            if !self.allow_broad_roots && FILESYSTEM_BROAD_ROOTS.contains(&normalized) {
                anyhow::bail!(
                    "path '{path}' is a broad system root; set allow_broad_roots = true to watch it"
                );
            }
        }
        for kind in &self.events {
            if !matches!(
                kind.as_str(),
                "created" | "modified" | "deleted" | "renamed"
            ) {
                anyhow::bail!(
                    "event '{kind}' is invalid; expected created, modified, deleted, or renamed"
                );
            }
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

View on GitHub (pinned to 88bb9c8533)

Solutions

  1. Narrow the path below the broad root, e.g. `/tmp/zeroclaw-watch` or `/home/user/project`.
  2. If you truly need the broad root, set `allow_broad_roots = true` and accept the event-volume and payload-exposure risk, ideally pairing it with include/exclude filters.
  3. For `/proc` and `/sys` specifically, prefer a targeted path or a different mechanism — they are near-unwatchable at volume.

Example fix

# before
paths = ["/tmp"]

# after
paths = ["/tmp/zeroclaw-watch"]
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

const BROAD: [&str; 8] = ["/", "/home", "/etc", "/var", "/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/tmp"];
let norm = |p: &str| {
    let t = p.trim_end_matches('/');
    if t.is_empty() { "/" } else { t }
};
anyhow::ensure!(
    cfg.allow_broad_roots || cfg.paths.iter().all(|p| !BROAD.contains(&norm(p))),
    "broad root watch requires allow_broad_roots = true"
);

Type guard

fn is_broad_root(path: &str) -> bool {
    let t = path.trim_end_matches('/');
    let n = if t.is_empty() { "/" } else { t };
    ["/", "/home", "/etc", "/var", "/proc", "/sys", "/dev", "/tmp"].contains(&n)
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: `paths = ["/tmp"]` or `paths = ["/"]` with `allow_broad_roots` unset (defaults false); `paths = ["/home/"]` (trailing slash trimmed, still denied); pasting a log-watching example that tails `/var`.

Common situations: Quick experiments that watch `/tmp` for scratch files; assuming `/home` is fine because it only contains user data; migrating from a simple inotify script that watched `/` without issues on tiny systems.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of zeroclaw-labs/zeroclaw@88bb9c8533 (2026-08-23). Data as JSON: /api/errors/e85ddcc2672cc386. Report an issue: GitHub.