ruvnet/ruflo · error · Error

Invalid git ref: suspicious pattern

Error message

Invalid git ref: suspicious pattern

What it means

Thrown by validateGitRef when the ref contains '..' (path-traversal indicator) but does NOT match the allowed range/range-abbrev patterns like 'a..b' or 'a..b' shorthand. Git ranges legitimately use '..' and '...' (e.g. 'main..feature', 'main...upstream'), so the validator permits those specific shapes and refuses anything else with double-dot — defending against '../' path escapes and '..@{-1}' style tricks.

Source

Thrown at v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/diff-classifier.ts:378

// ============================================================================

// Cache for diff results (TTL-based)
const diffCache = new Map<string, { files: DiffFile[]; timestamp: number }>();
const CACHE_TTL_MS = 5000; // 5 seconds - short TTL since diffs change frequently

/**
 * Validate git ref to prevent command injection
 * Only allows safe characters: alphanumeric, -, _, /, ., ~, ^
 */
function validateGitRef(ref: string): void {
  // Block shell metacharacters and dangerous patterns
  if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-./~^@]+$/.test(ref)) {
    throw new Error(`Invalid git ref: contains unsafe characters`);
  }
  // Block multiple dots (path traversal)
  if (ref.includes('..') && !ref.match(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+\.\.\.?[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+$/)) {
    if (!/^\w+\.\.[.\w]+$/.test(ref)) {
      throw new Error(`Invalid git ref: suspicious pattern`);
    }
  }
  // Max length check
  if (ref.length > 256) {
    throw new Error(`Invalid git ref: too long`);
  }
}

/**
 * Get git diff statistics using SINGLE combined command (optimized)
 * Replaces two separate git commands with one
 */
export function getGitDiffNumstat(ref: string = 'HEAD'): DiffFile[] {
  // SECURITY: Validate git ref to prevent command injection
  validateGitRef(ref);

  // Check cache first
  const cacheKey = `numstat:${ref}`;

View on GitHub (pinned to 6b01dc5a68)

Solutions

  1. If you intend a git range, use the canonical 'a..b' or 'a...b' form with simple branch names on each side.
  2. If the ref is meant as a path, reject '..' at the application layer and never let it reach git.
  3. Pre-validate with git rev-parse --verify <ref> in a sandbox to confirm the ref resolves before handing it to the diff tool.

Example fix

// before
const files = getGitDiffNumstat('../main');

// after — use canonical range syntax
const files = getGitDiffNumstat('main..feature');
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

function asGitRange(a: string, b: string): string {
  const clean = (s: string) => s.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_\-.]/g, '');
  return `${clean(a)}..${clean(b)}`; // canonical range, no traversal chars possible
}

const ref = asGitRange(baseBranch, featureBranch);
// passes validateGitRef because both sides match the range pattern
const files = getGitDiffNumstat(ref);

Type guard

function isSafeGitRange(ref: string): boolean {
  return /^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+\.\.\.?[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+$/.test(ref);
}

Try / catch

try {
  return getGitDiffNumstat(ref);
} catch (e) {
  if (/suspicious pattern/.test(String(e))) {
    // The ref contains '..' but isn't a clean range. Refuse rather than rewrite —
    // path traversal attempts must not be 'fixed' by normalization.
    throw new Error(`refused suspicious ref: ${JSON.stringify(ref)}`);
  }
  throw e;
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: Ref like '../secret' or '../../etc/passwd'; ref like 'foo..bar/baz/../x' mixing a range with traversal; ref like 'a..b..c' (more than one double-dot); a branch name someone literally created with '..' that isn't a clean range.

Common situations: Path-style ref ('../feature/foo') mistaken for a git range; ref constructed by joining path segments that included parent-dir traversal; branch name with '..' submitted via an API without normalization.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of ruvnet/ruflo@6b01dc5a68 (2026-08-12). Data as JSON: /api/errors/86893b0a56bbb3c5. Report an issue: GitHub.