ruvnet/ruflo · warning · Error

Invalid git ref: too long

Error message

Invalid git ref: too long

What it means

Thrown by validateGitRef when ref.length > 256. Git refs are bounded in practice (git itself enforces no hard limit but refs longer than a few hundred chars are always pathological), so this guard caps the input to block memory/cpu abuse and malformed inputs. This is the third and final validation check, after character-class and '..' checks.

Source

Thrown at v3/@claude-flow/cli/src/ruvector/diff-classifier.ts:383

/**
 * Validate git ref to prevent command injection
 * Only allows safe characters: alphanumeric, -, _, /, ., ~, ^
 */
function validateGitRef(ref: string): void {
  // Block shell metacharacters and dangerous patterns
  if (!/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-./~^@]+$/.test(ref)) {
    throw new Error(`Invalid git ref: contains unsafe characters`);
  }
  // Block multiple dots (path traversal)
  if (ref.includes('..') && !ref.match(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+\.\.\.?[a-zA-Z0-9_\-]+$/)) {
    if (!/^\w+\.\.[.\w]+$/.test(ref)) {
      throw new Error(`Invalid git ref: suspicious pattern`);
    }
  }
  // Max length check
  if (ref.length > 256) {
    throw new Error(`Invalid git ref: too long`);
  }
}

/**
 * Get git diff statistics using SINGLE combined command (optimized)
 * Replaces two separate git commands with one
 */
export function getGitDiffNumstat(ref: string = 'HEAD'): DiffFile[] {
  // SECURITY: Validate git ref to prevent command injection
  validateGitRef(ref);

  // Check cache first
  const cacheKey = `numstat:${ref}`;
  const cached = diffCache.get(cacheKey);
  if (cached && Date.now() - cached.timestamp < CACHE_TTL_MS) {
    return cached.files;
  }

View on GitHub (pinned to 6b01dc5a68)

Solutions

  1. Enforce a length cap at the application boundary (e.g. truncate or reject refs > 200 chars) before calling getGitDiffNumstat.
  2. If you genuinely need long refs, you can't bypass this guard — refactor to a shorter alias (git update-ref).
  3. Treat a >256 char ref as a bug in the upstream caller, not a legitimate input.

Example fix

// before
const files = getGitDiffNumstat(veryLongRef);

// after — bound the length at the call site
if (ref.length > 256) throw new Error(`ref too long (${ref.length}); expected < 256`);
const files = getGitDiffNumstat(ref);
Defensive patterns

Strategy: validation

Validate before calling

function boundedGitRef(ref: unknown): string {
  const s = String(ref ?? 'HEAD');
  if (s.length > 200) throw new Error(`ref too long (${s.length}); expected < 200 chars`);
  return s;
}

const files = getGitDiffNumstat(boundedGitRef(req.query.ref));

Type guard

function isLengthBoundedRef(ref: string, max = 256): boolean {
  return typeof ref === 'string' && ref.length <= max;
}

Try / catch

try {
  return getGitDiffNumstat(ref);
} catch (e) {
  if (/too long/.test(String(e))) {
    throw new Error(`ref length ${String(ref).length} exceeds limit; input is pathological`);
  }
  throw e;
}

Prevention

When it happens

Trigger: A ref string built by concatenating many segments without bound; a ref read from a file/blob that wasn't truncated; a malformed input that's actually a git object ID with extra padding; an attacker probing with very long inputs (the validator is called on every diff).

Common situations: Tool reads a ref from a URL query string with no length cap; ref comes from unbounded user input in a dashboard; a bug concatenates the same ref repeatedly into one string.

Related errors


AI-assisted analysis of ruvnet/ruflo@6b01dc5a68 (2026-08-12). Data as JSON: /api/errors/f4fc230f7c341964. Report an issue: GitHub.